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Canada’s Criminal Code1 does not criminalize the sale of sex, but instead regulates 
the activities which surround commercial sexual acts. In 2007, Terri Jean Bedford, 
Amy Lebovitch and Valerie Scott launched a constitutional challenge on the 
provisions of the Criminal Code prohibiting: keeping a common bawdy house (s. 
210), living on the avails of prostitution (s. 212(1)(j)) and communicating for the 
purposes of prostitution (s. 213 (1)(c)).2 They argued these provisions contribute to 
the risk that sex trade workers will become victims of violence, in violation of their 
rights to liberty and security of the person under s. 7 of the Charter.3 The applicants 
also submitted that the communicating provision was a violation of their s. 2(b) right 
to freedom of expression under the Charter.4 Each of the women has a lengthy 
history of work in the sex trade. Lebovitch continues to earn a living through sex 
work, while both Bedford and Scott expressed a desire to return to the profession. 
All three are members of Sex Professionals of Canada, an organization that 
advocates for the decriminalization of sex work. Their victory at the Ontario 
Superior Court of Justice and partial victory at the Ontario Court of Appeal5 signals 
that the dialogue about how prostitution is regulated in Canada has been re-opened. 
On June 12, 2013, the Supreme Court of Canada will hear the appeal of the Attorney 
General and Bedford’s cross-appeal.6  
 
 
Bedford argued the bawdy-house provision forces sex workers to practice 
their trade in public places, rather than from safer, indoor locations.7 A bawdy-house 	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 1 Criminal Code, RSC 1985, c C-46 [Criminal Code].	  
2 Bedford v Canada (Attorney General), 2010 ONSC 4264 [Bedford].
 
3 Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, Part I of the Constitution Act, 1982, being schedule B to the 
Canada Act 1982 (UK), 1982, c 11, s.7. Everyone has the right to life, liberty and security of the person 
and the right not to be deprived thereof except in accordance with the principles of fundamental justice. 
 
4  See Charter, Ibid s 2(b). Everyone has the following fundamental freedoms: freedom of thought, belief, 
opinion and expression, including freedom of the press and other media of communication.
 
5 Canada (Attorney General) v. Bedford, 2012 ONCA 186 at 325 [Bedford Appeal].
 
6 Canada (Attorney General) v. Bedford, [2012] SCCA 159.
 
7 Bedford, supra note 2 at 11.
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is defined in s. 197 (1) as: “a place that is kept or occupied, or resorted to by one or 
more persons, for the purpose of prostitution or to practice acts of indecency”.8 
Courts have interpreted “place” broadly to mean that “any defined space is capable 
of being a bawdy-house, from a hotel, to a house, to a parking lot – provided that 
there is frequent or habitual use of it for the purposes of prostitution.”9 As a result, 
virtually wherever a sex worker chooses to work may make them liable under the 
criminal law. The offence carries a maximum penalty of two years imprisonment. 
 
 
Section 212 of the Criminal Code lists various offences, under the general 
heading of “procuring” including enticing a person to enter into prostitution, and 
exercising control or force over a person who has been compelled into the sex trade. 
The applicants challenged only the constitutionality of s. 212 (1)(j), which creates the 
offence of living wholly or partly on the avails of prostitution, commonly referred to 
as “pimping.” A conviction under this section carries a maximum penalty of ten 
years in prison. Under s. 212(3), anyone who “lives with or is habitually in the 
company of a prostitute” is presumed to be “living on the avails of prostitution.” 
Thus, spouses, partners and even roommates of a sex worker could be convicted of 
pimping, unless they can introduce evidence rebutting the presumption.10 This 
section also creates the risk of prosecution for people the sex worker might hire to 
work as drivers, security, or reception staff.  As the applicants argued in Bedford, 
having such staff creates a safer environment for those in the sex trade.11 The ability 
to have staff is often closely linked to the being able to work in an indoor location.  
 
 
The communicating provision in s. 213 of the Criminal Code prohibits: 
stopping or attempting to stop a motor vehicle or a person, or impeding access to or 
from a public place for the purposes of prostitution.12 The applicants argued that this 
provision forces sex workers to operate covertly, often without the necessary time to 
assess whether a client is potentially threatening, prior to accepting them.13   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
8 Criminal Code, supra note 1, s 197 (1).
 
9  Parliamentary Information and Research Service, Prostitution in Canada: International Obligations, 
Federal Law, and Provincial and Municipal Jurisdiction by Laura Barnett (Ottawa: Library of Parliament, 
2004)  Online: Government of Canada Publications 
<http://www.parl.gc.ca/Content/LOP/researchpublications/prb0330-e.htm#criminalcode>.
 
10 The authority that allows the presumption to be rebutted was developed by the court in R. v. Grilo 
(1991), 2 OR (3d) 514. Justice Arbour stated: “The true parasite whom s. 212(1)(j) seeks to punish is 
someone the prostitute is not otherwise legally or morally obligated to support. 
 
11 Bedford, supra note 2 at 11; Criminal Code, supra note 1, s 3.; Karin Galldin et al, “Bedford v. 
Canada: a paradigmatic case toward ensuring the human and health rights of sex workers” (2011) 15 
HIV/AIDS Policy Review at 5 [Galldin et al].
 
12 Criminal Code, supra note 1.
 
13 Bedford, supra note 2 at 11. 
 






This paper will offer insight into how the Supreme Court will decide the 
Bedford appeal by closely examining the issues presented through the trial and the 
appeal. The paper will also weigh the decision of the Supreme Court in the 1990 
Prostitution Reference14 upholding the impugned provisions and the 2011 Supreme 
Court decision Canada (Attorney General) v. PHS Community Services Society15 
(PHS), which offers a way to move forward. The harms that sex workers face are at 
the heart of the Bedford case, which is what separates it from the Prostitution 
Reference. Instead of considering sex work generally, the Bedford appeal gives the 
issue a human face and asks for the striking of laws that put sex workers at risk of 
violence. The issue of harms and the wealth of evidence supporting the fact that the 
impugned provisions of the Criminal Code aggravate the harms faced by sex 
workers were not put forward in the Prostitution Reference. In addition, the 
principles of fundamental justice that the Court uses to scrutinize provisions 
challenged under s. 7 of the Charter have also evolved considerably in the 
intervening years. The principles that define when a government needs to consider 
the adverse harms caused by legislative and decision-making processes set out in 
PHS offer insight into how the issues raised in Bedford may be interpreted. 
Examining the evidence presented at trial and the Court of Appeal leads to an 
appreciation for the need to decriminalize sex work. The Supreme Court should not 
feel bound by the Prostitution Reference, which focused on different issues and did 
not have the benefit of the recent PHS case, which I argue indicates a way for the 
Supreme Court to decriminalize sex work in Canada. 
 
 
THE PROSTITUTION REFERENCE 
 
The Supreme Court upheld the constitutionality of both the bawdy-house and 
communicating provisions of the Criminal Code in the 1990 Prostitution Reference. 
An understanding of the Prostitution Reference is essential to appreciating the issues 
raised in Bedford. At trial and on appeal, Bedford submitted the Prostitution 
Reference was distinguishable and the Attorney General contended that it is a 
binding authority.  
 
 
In the Prostitution Reference, the Supreme Court was asked to determine 
whether the provisions of the Criminal Code dealing with bawdy-houses (s. 193, 
now s. 210) and communicating for the purposes of prostitution (s. 195 (1)(c), now s. 
213 (1)(c)), separately or in combination, were a violation of ss. 2(b) or 7 of the 
Charter. Chief Justice Dickson, writing for the majority concluded both provisions 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
14 Reference re ss. 193 and 195.1 (1)(C) of the Criminal Code (Man.) [1990] 1 SCR 1123 at 21 
[Prostitution Reference].  
 
15 Canada (Attorney General) v. PHS Community Services Society 2011 SCC 44 [PHS].
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were consistent with s.7.16 While the liberty interests were engaged by the possibility 
of imprisonment, the provisions could not be determined to be sufficiently “unfair as 
to violate the principles of fundamental justice”.17 The majority also found the 
bawdy-house provision did not infringe on a person’s right to freedom of 
expression.18 With respect to communicating, the majority determined that while 
there was an infringement to the s. 2(b) right of freedom of expression it could be 
upheld as a justifiable limit.19 Dickson CJ described the legislative objective of the 
communicating provision as suppressing the social nuisance caused by public 
solicitation and keeping it out of the view of the public.20  
 
 
Despite reaching the same conclusions in his own reasons, Lamer J’s 
opinion in the Prostitution Reference branched into a discussion of economic liberty, 
which highlights the difference between what the Supreme Court was asked to 
decide in 1990 and what Bedford is asking the Court to decide now. The argument in 
1990, as summarized by Lamer J, was that the impugned provisions violated liberty 
under s. 7 because sex workers were unable to “exercise their chosen profession”, 
which then violated their right to security of the person by rendering them unable to 
provide for themselves.21 While he could not accept that the infringement was 
contrary to the principles of fundamental justice, he encapsulated when s. 7 is 
triggered, stating that it is “implicated when the state restricts individuals’ security of 
the person by interfering with, or removing from them, control over their physical or 
mental integrity”,22 which is precisely the argument being made in Bedford.  Lamer J 
also characterized the legislative objective of communicating differently from the 
majority of the court. His definition extended to “general confusion and congestion 
that is accompanied by an increase in related criminal activity such as possession and 
trafficking of drugs, violence and pimping”.23 It is important to remember that this 
view was that of Lamer J alone as his characterization is raised by the Ontario Court 
of Appeal in Bedford. 
 
 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
16 Prostitution Reference, supra note 14 at 21. 
 
17 Ibid at 19. 
 
18 Ibid at 1.
 
19 Ibid at 11. 
 
20 Ibid at 2. 
 
21 Ibid at 49
 
22 Ibid at 68.
 
23 Ibid at 95 & 97. 
 




In dissent, in her s.7 analysis, Wilson J found that while the bawdy-house 
provision could be considered consistent with s. 7 of the Charter, the communicating 
provision did constitute a breach.24 In her view, the risk of incarceration was 
disproportionate to the legislative objective of curbing public nuisance, especially in 
light of her finding that the communicating provision also violated a person’s right to 
freedom of expression and could not be upheld by s. 1.25  
 
 
The Trial Decision 
 
The arguments of both Bedford and the Attorney General presented the Application 
Judge (Justice Susan Himel) with a formidable task because of the stigma attached to 
sex work. Bedford’s position was that the criminal prohibitions make sex work more 
dangerous and that the Supreme Court decision in the Prostitution Reference relating 
to communicating and freedom of expression needed to be revisited in light of “new 
evidence and a material change in circumstances.”26 The Attorney General of Canada 
argued Bedford had not shown sufficient reasons in law or new evidence which 
would warrant a re-evaluation of the Supreme Court’s previous ruling and that the 
danger inherent in the sex trade was not caused by the impugned provisions.27 
Interveners, the Attorney General of Ontario, the Christian Legal Fellowship, REAL 
Women of Canada and the Catholic Civil Rights League all spoke to human dignity 
and vulnerability of the people that the impugned provisions were enacted to 
protect.28 The judgment of Himel J shows thoughtful consideration of the issues, 
presented in a manner that demonstrated that she anticipated an appeal of the 
decision. Himel J found the impugned provisions unconstitutional for exacerbating 
the harms faced by sex workers.  
 
 
The risk of imprisonment is sufficient to initiate a review of the impugned 
provisions under s. 7 of the Charter because of the threat to a person’s liberty.29 
Bedford argued their security of the person was also at issue because of the risk of 
violence sex workers face. Himel J. found the threat of violence forced sex workers 
to choose “between their liberty and their security of the person” and the evidence 
demonstrated that the impugned provisions played “significantly contributory role” 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
24 Ibid at 158.
 
25 Ibid at 157.
 
26 Bedford, supra note 2 at 13.
 
27 Ibid at 15-17.
 
28 Ibid at 21-24.
 
29 Re BC Motor Vehicle Act, [1985] 2 SCR 486 at 74; Bedford, Supra note 2 at 281; Prostitution 
Reference, supra note 18 at 15.
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by prohibiting actions that would make sex work safer. 30 With s. 7 engaged, Himel J 
was then tasked with determining if the interference with the rights to liberty and 
security of the person were in accordance with the principles of fundamental 
justice.31 Her analysis included the principles against: arbitrariness, overbreadth and 
gross disproportionality and she determined that it was unnecessary to consider the 
principle of the rule of law as it was inapplicable in this case.32  
 
 
To determine if any or all of the provisions violated these principles of 
fundamental justice, Himel J surveyed the history of each provision to determine the 
legislative objectives. She found that the bawdy-house provision was aimed at 
“combating neighbourhood disruption and disorder and safeguarding public health 
and safety”.33 The objective of the provision prohibiting living on the avails of 
prostitution is to protect prostitutes from those who may seek to profit from their 
work.34 Finally, relying on the determination of the Supreme Court in the 
Prostitution Reference, the communicating provision is an attempt to “eradicate the 
various forms of social nuisance arising from the public display of the sale of sex”.35  
 
 
Based on these determinations, Himel J found that the bawdy-house 
provision was both overbroad, because the “wide geographic scope” that 
encompasses areas beyond a “traditional brothel”36 and grossly disproportionate to 
the intended objectives, because sex workers are denied the safety and stability that a 
permanent indoor location can provide.37 She found the living on the avails provision 
to be arbitrary, because sex workers are prohibited from hiring anyone who could 
make their work safer,38 overbroad for its inclusion of “non-exploitive 
arrangements”,39 and grossly disproportionate as it forces sex workers to choose 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
30 Bedford, supra note 2 at 362.
 
31 Chaoulli v. Quebec (Attorney General), 2005 SCC 35 at 109, per McLachlin C.J. and Major J.; Malmo-
Levine; R v. Clay [2003] 3 SCR 571 at 83.
 
32 Bedford, supra note 2 at 439.
 
33 Bedford, supra note 2 at 242.  
 
34 Ibid at 259.
 
35 Ibid at 374; Prostitution Reference, supra note 14 at 2.
 
36 Bedford, supra note 2 at 400-401.
 
37 Ibid at 428.
 
38 Ibid at 379.
 
39 Ibid at 402.
 




between their own safety and jeopardizing the liberty of another.40 The 
communicating provision was determined to be grossly disproportionate in light of 
the evidence that the provision prevents the screening of clients and disperses sex 
workers to more isolated areas.41 In Himel J’s weighing of the evidence she found 
that the breach of the s.7 Charter rights could not be saved by an analysis under s. 1, 
because the challenged provisions are disproportionate and cause more than a 
minimal impairment to the rights of sex workers.42  
 
 
Bedford also challenged the communicating provision under s. 2(b) of the 
Charter, as an unconstitutional limit on freedom of expression. Previously this 
provision had been determined- by the Supreme Court in the Prostitution Reference- 
as a “prima facie infringement of s. 2(b)”, which Himel J accepted.43 Given the 
established infringement of the right, she moved on to consider the infringement in 
light of the test developed in R v Oakes.44 The test dictates that the impugned 
provision must have a “pressing and substantial” objective.45 Concurring with the 
finding of Dickson CJ in the Prostitution Reference, Himel J found that eliminating 
social nuisance represented a legitimate pressing and substantial objective.46  
 
 
The second part of the test requires that the provision is rationally connected 
to the objective, while impairing the right “as little as possible” and the impairment 
of the right must be proportional to the objective.47 Himel J found the “need to 
safeguard their own bodily integrity through communication with customers lies at 
or near the core of expression s. 2(b) of the Charter seeks to protect.”48 Her 
assessment departed greatly from Dickson CJ in the Prostitution Reference who 
stated: “It can hardly be said that communications regarding an economic transaction 
of sex for money lie at, or even near, the core of the guarantee of freedom of 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
40 Ibid at 431.
 
41 Ibid at 434.
 
42 Ibid at 441. Being that Himel J. only included a very succinct analysis of s. 1, the full test is articulated 
below, in relation to the challenge of the communicating provision to freedom of expression, as 
guaranteed by s. 2(b). 
 
43 Ibid at 444; Prostitution Reference, supra note 14 at 1.
 
44 Bedford, supra note 2 at 446; R v. Oakes, [1986] 1 SCR 103 [Oakes].
 
45 Ibid at 69.
 
46 Bedford, supra note 2 at 448.
 
47 Oakes, supra note 44 at 70
 
48 Bedford, supra note 2 at 462.
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expression.”49 The difference of opinion is understandable considering Himel J had 
the benefit of over 25,000 pages of evidence, in addition to witnesses ranging from 
sex workers, to police, to social workers, and academics.50  Apart from the 
recommendations of the Special Committee on Pornography and Prostitution which 
were released in 1985, much of the evidence relied upon in the Bedford case was not 
available at the time of the Prostitution Reference.  
 
 
Himel J found the communicating provision was rationally connected to the 
objective of curbing social nuisance, but (just as Wilson J found in her dissent in the 
Prostitution Reference) the provision represented more than a minimal impairment to 
the right of freedom of expression.51 In the final balancing, Himel J found the 
prohibition on communicating adds to the risk that sex workers will become victims 
of violence and that this was “simply too high a price to pay” to curb social nuisance 
and represented an “unjustifiable limit” on freedom of expression.52 
 
 
Himel J struck down the three challenged provisions, because of the 
infringement of the rights of sex workers. The judgment was stayed for 30 days to 
avoid a legislative gap.53 A stay of Himel J’s judgment remained in effect pending 
the outcome of the appeal.  
 
 
THE ONTARIO COURT OF APPEAL DECISION 
 
The Attorney General of Canada and the Attorney General of Ontario, appealed the 
decision to the Ontario Court of Appeal. The decision was released on March 26, 
2012 upholding the decision of Himel J that the bawdy-house and living on the 
avails provisions are unconstitutional.54 All five judges were unanimous in their 
decision on these two provisions. With respect to living on the avails of prostitution 
in s. 212(1)(j), the court read in the words “in the circumstances of exploitation” to 
clarify when it will be permissible to benefit from the proceeds of sex work.55  While 
the partial remedy granted by the Court of Appeal represents a victory for sex 
workers generally, the failure of the majority to uphold the application judge’s ruling 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
49 Prostitution Reference, supra note 14 at 5.
 
50 Bedford, supra note 2 at 84.
 
51 Ibid at 481. 
 
52 Ibid at 504-505. 
 
53 Ibid at 539.
 
54 Bedford Appeal supra, note 5 at 325.
 
55 Ibid at 327.
 




on the communicating provision means that street-based sex workers will continue to 
rush into transactions with clients that they have not had time to screen. 
 
 
The majority of the Court of Appeal held that the decision of the Supreme 
Court in the Prostitution Reference deeming the communicating provision to be a 
reasonable limit on freedom of expression under s. 2(b) of the Charter remained 
binding on the trial judge.56 When it came to the constitutionality of the 
communicating provision with respect to s. 7, there was a stark difference of opinion. 
The majority disagreed with Himel J’s finding that the communicating provision was 
grossly disproportionate and did not find a s. 7 violation.  In dissent, MacPherson JA   




In the majority’s assessment of the communicating provision and the 
principles of fundamental justice, they agreed with Himel J that a provision is not 
rendered arbitrary because it is ineffective.57 Thus, they concurred with the 
application judge that the communicating provision is not arbitrary, despite their 
disagreement with her finding that the law was ineffective in reducing street 
solicitation.58 The majority also agreed with Himel J’s finding that the 
communicating provision was not overbroad.59 However, they concluded that Himel 
J’s analysis of the communicating provision and principles of gross 
disproportionality was flawed.60 They found that in the balancing of the objective 
and the effects of the law, too little weight had been given by Himel J to the 
objective, while too much was assigned to the effects.61 
 
 
At the appeal, the Attorney General of Canada argued Himel J “failed to 
take into account the seriousness of nuisance presented by street prostitution, which 
is attended by drug use and other crimes.”62 This argument was a parallel of Lamer 
J’s characterization of the legislative objective in the Prostitution Reference;63 a view 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
56 Ibid at 328.
 
57 Ibid at 287; Bedford, supra note 2 at 383.
 
58 Bedford Appeal, supra note 5 at 289; Bedford, supra note 2 at 383.
 
59 Bedford Appeal, supra note 5 at 290.
 




62 Bedford Appeal, supra note 5 at 285.
 
63 Prostitution Reference, supra note 14 at 95
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rejected by the majority.64 The majority of the Court of Appeal in Bedford 
controversially agreed with the Attorney General and found that Himel J “under-
emphasized the importance of the legislative objective”, for failing to take into 
account the same activities that were included in Lamer J’s rejected characterization 
of the legislative objective. The majority also found that given the striking down of 
the bawdy-house provision less weight should be accorded to harms caused by the 
communicating provision, because sex workers would now have the option to move 
to indoor locations.65 
 
 
The majority in the Bedford appeal also held that the application judge had 
placed too much weight on the impact the communicating provision has on sex 
workers.66 Himel J saw the ability to screen clients as an “essential tool” to 
enhancing the safety of sex workers. The majority at the Court of Appeal was not 
convinced that the evidence supported this.67 Instead, they found that Himel J drew 
her conclusion from the “anecdotal evidence from prostitutes.”68 This reinforcement 
of the outdated notion that sex workers are unreliable witnesses, because of their 
chosen profession is an error by the Court of Appeal.  Beyond sex workers 
themselves, the screening of clients is discussed several times in Himel J’s judgment. 
Dr. Gayle MacDonald’s 2006 presentation to the House of Commons Standing 
Committee on Justice and Human Rights Subcommittee on Solicitation, which 
Himel J quotes, supports the use of screening as a safety mechanism: 
 
 
Continued criminalization, specifically the communications provision of 
the Criminal Code, puts the sex worker in danger by increasing the 
speed of the negotiation of terms between the sex worker and her client, 
which is the most critical point for her to assess the client’s propensity 
to violence. If the sex worker is rushing to avoid encounters with police, 
she may misjudge – at great peril to her – the safety of a client.69 
 
 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
64 Dickson CJ, in the Prostitution Reference, supra note 14 at 2.
 
65 Bedford Appeal, supra note 5 at 309.
 
66 Ibid at 305.
 
67 Ibid at 310.
 
68 Bedford Appeal, supra note 5 at 311.
 
69 Bedford, supra note 2 at 171. Dr. MacDonald is a Professor of Sociology at St. Thomas University, 
where she is also the Assistant Vice-President (Research). She holds a BA (Dalhousie), MA (Ottawa) and 
a PhD (UNB). She has published extensively on sex work including the book “Sex Workers of the 
Maritimes Talk Back (2006) with co-author with Leslie Jeffrey. Dr. MacDonald also contributed to the 
forthcoming book Selling Sex: Experience, Advocacy, and Research on Sex Work in Canada (UBC Press, 
2013).     
 




The views of MacDonald, who also served as an affiant for Bedford, are echoed by 
other expert witnesses including: Dr. Augustine Brannigan,70 Dr. Eleanor Maticka-
Tyndale,71 Dr. Cecilia Benoit,72 and Dr. Frances Shaver.73 Himel J also referenced 
the ability of decriminalized sex workers in New Zealand to make better assessments 
of potential clients because they no longer fear prosecution.74 While decriminalized 
sex workers in New Zealand still face stigma, “the realisation of employment and 
legal rights has given many sex workers conﬁdence to avert or react to situations that 
hold the potential for violence”.75 While the majority of the Court of Appeal felt 
Himel J’s conclusion on the effectiveness of screening as a safety tool reached “well 




The majority of the Court of Appeal also disagreed with Himel J’s 
comparison of the case at bar with PHS, finding it “is simply not comparable” to 
draw parallels between the communicating provision’s effects on sex workers with 
the consequences of the Minister’s denial of an exemption from the Controlled 
Drugs and Substances Act77 on drug addicts.78 While the court recognized the 
distinct vulnerability of sex workers on the streets and acknowledged that, even with 
the ability to move to indoor sites many would not have the resources to facilitate 
such a move. The majority was unconvinced that the impact of the communicating 
provision was a factor that, when combined with the other evidence, would tip the 





 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
70 Ibid at 307.
 
71 Ibid at 337.
 
72 Ibid at 339.
 
73 Ibid at 340.
 
74 Ibid at 194.
 
75 Gillian Abel and Lisa Fitzgerald, “Risk and risk management in sex work post-Prostitution Reform 
Act: a public health perspective” in Taking the Crime Out of Sex Work: New Zealand Sex Workers’ Fight 
for Decriminalisation, Gillian Abel et al Eds. (Portland: Policy Press, 2010). 
 
76 Bedford Appeal, supra note 5 at 311.
 
77 Controlled Drugs and Substances Act SC 1996, c 19.
 
78 Bedford Appeal, supra note 5 at 315.
 
79 Ibid at 322
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THE DISSENT OF MACPHERSON JA 
 
Writing in dissent, MacPherson JA concurred with the analysis of the majority on all 
points except for their finding that the communicating provision was not grossly 
disproportionate. MacPherson JA would have upheld the application judge’s finding 
of gross disproportionality in violation of s. 7 of the Charter.80 MacPherson JA 
alleged that the majority without reason, used a different method is assessing the 
communicating provision and that the analysis was in stark opposition to the method 
and reasoning which was used to amend the provisions concerning bawdy-houses 
and living on the avails. It was MacPherson JA’s opinion that even with the 
amendments to the bawdy-house and living on the avails provisions, the 
communicating provision still prevents sex workers from using all available means 
to protect themselves. He offers seven reasons to support his conclusion that the 




MacPherson JA took support for a finding of gross disproportionality within 
the majority’s own conclusions on the bawdy-house and living on the avails 
provisions. He disagreed with the change in the tone of the analysis for 
communicating and the incorporation of the concepts of “cruel and unusual 
punishment” and “abhorrent or intolerable” to the analysis.81 While it is correct that 
the test for gross disproportionality under s. 12 of the Charter82 requires a similar 
balancing test including these notions, these “touchstones” were not brought into 
consideration in determining the previous two provisions.83 Further, this treatment 
was not only different from the treatment given to the other provisions, but it was 
contradictory to statements made by the majority that found that the communicating 
provision contributed “equally” to the violence sex workers face.84 MacPerson JA’s 
position was that if the bawdy-house and living on the avails provisions could not be 
upheld then the communicating provision “with its equally serious – and perhaps 
worse – effects on prostitutes” should not be upheld either.85  
 
 
The opinion of MacPherson JA that these provisions are so closely linked 
that they should receive similar treatment, could lend itself to an argument that 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
80 Ibid at 333.
 
81 Ibid at 339; Source of quote on which MacPherson J.A. relies at 300.
 
82 Charter, supra note 3, s. 12. Everyone has the right not to be subjected to any cruel and unusual 
treatment or punishment.
 
83 Bedford Appeal, supra note 5 at 340.
 
84 Ibid at 343. Source of quote on which MacPherson J.A. relies at 206.
 
85  Ibid at 344. 
 




perhaps all three provisions should be upheld as constitutional. However, each of the 
provisions contributes to the risk of violence faced by sex workers. It is difficult to 
separate the effects of the impugned provisions. Kara Gillies is a long time sex 
worker and an activist with Maggie’s, an intervening organization. She describes the 
inter-play between the impugned provisions and how the communicating provision 
still hinders a sex workers ability to work safely:  
 
 
It is not tenable to have a safe place to see a client if you can’t screen 
him first or clearly set out what you offer, your rates and your safe sex 
requirements. Further, many street-based workers don’t have access to 
an indoor place to work.86 
 
 
If the concepts of  “cruel and unusual punishment”, “abhorrent” and 
“intolerable” are to be incorporated into the analysis, the evidence before the court 
clearly indicates that violence is occurring and that the impugned provisions prevent 
sex workers from protecting themselves and from working with police to see that 
perpetrators of violence are punished. It is difficult to make an argument that 
violence is an acceptable alternative to calm and orderly neighbourhoods, which is 
the legislative objective of the communicating provision that the Supreme Court 
agreed upon in the Prostitution Reference. Further, the reasons of MacPherson JA 
point out that the application judge was correct in her appraisal of the legislative 
objective of the communicating provision. MacPherson JA found that by including 
criminal conduct commonly associated with street solicitation, the majority had 
inflated the actual legislative objective than what was accepted by the majority of the 
Supreme Court in the Prostitution Reference.87  
 
 
MacPherson JA also took issue with the weight assigned to the importance 
of sex workers being able to screen their clients, largely prevented by the 
communicating provision. His opinion was that the fallibleness of screening as a 
means of protection against violence does not diminish its value.88 MacPherson JA 
reasoned further that the majority took a narrow view by failing to consider the other 
risks to safety, beyond an inability to screen clients, which are caused by the 
provision.89 In agreement with the application judge, MacPherson JA found that the 
effect of the provision also displaced and dispersed sex workers, which added to their 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
86 Maggie’s Toronto Sex Workers Action Project, Press Release, “Ontario Court Leaves Most Vulnerable 
Sex Workers Unprotected”(26 March 2012) Online: Maggie's Toronto Sex Workers Action Project 
<http://maggiestoronto.ca/press-releases?news_id=86>.
 
87 Bedford Appeal, supra note 5 at 345-47. Source of quote on which MacPherson J.A. relies at 307.
 
88 Ibid at 348. 
 
89 Ibid at 351.  
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MacPherson JA recognized that the provision “denies an already vulnerable 
person the opportunity to protect herself from serious physical violence.”91 He 
referenced the interveners who advocated that the communicating provision 
adversely affect street prostitutes who are already part of groups who are 
traditionally marginalized. This is particularly clear from research conducted in 
Vancouver’s Downtown Eastside that found  “almost 70% of women working in the 
lowest paying and most dangerous street sex work tracts are women of Aboriginal 
ancestry”.92 MacPherson JA cited the Supreme Court authority of New Brunswick 
(Minister of Health and Community Services) v. G.(J.), which compels a 
consideration of s. 7 rights with a view to the equality rights granted under s. 15 of 
the Charter.93 MacPherson JA recognized the reality that street prostitution will not 
disappear, because of the changes to the bawdy-house provision and that the 
communicating provision would continue to limit the means of street prostitutes to 
protect themselves.94  
 
 
The Attorneys General argued the impugned provisions were not the cause 
of the depravation of security of the person, because it is the actions of others – 
namely clients - at the root of the violence faced by sex workers. In considering this 
argument, the majority acknowledged similarities between sex workers and the 
addicts who sought access to a safe-injection site in PHS.95 MacPherson JA took 
issue with their sudden change in position, finding that “the application judge also 




The final reason for MacPherson JA’s dissent is that he found that the 
amendments made to the bawdy-house and living on the avails provisions were not 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
90 Ibid at 353.  
 
91 Ibid at 360.  
 
92 Dara Culhane, “Their spirits live within us: Aboriginal Women in Downtown Eastside Vancouver 
Emerging into Visibility” (2003) 27 Am Indian Q 593-601 at 597. 
 
93Bedford Appeal, supra note 5 at 356; citing New Brunswick Minister of Health and Community Services 
v. GJ, [1999] 3 SCR 46 at 115.  
 
94Bedford Appeal, supra note 5 at 360.  
 
95Ibid at 116.  
 
96 Ibid at 315.  
 




enough to provide a sufficient remedy. Again he acknowledged street prostitution 
will continue and that the communicating provision, if it is allowed to stand, will 
continue to put sex workers at an increased risk of becoming victims of violence. 
MacPherson JA concluded by concurring with the application judge’s assessment 
that the communicating provision is unconstitutional. 
 
 
REVISITING THE PROSTITUTION REFERENCE  
 
The argument of Bedford et al in asking the court to reexamine the bawdy-house and 
communicating provisions under s. 7 of the Charter was that the Prostitution 
Reference only considered the right to liberty and the vagueness of the impugned 
provisions, in contrast to their contention that the provisions also violated security of 
the person and are not in accordance with the principles of fundamental justice 
against arbitrariness, overbreadth and gross disproportionality and the rule of law, 
which had not been developed at the time of the reference.97 
 
 
Bedford asserted that they were asking the court to reconsider the 
communicating provision under s. 2(b) in a different context than the previous case 
because the situation facing sex workers had changed in the intervening years. 
Whereas the Prostitution Reference focused on the impugned provisions as a barrier 
to economic liberty, the core of the Bedford case was centered on the harms that sex 
workers faced because of the impugned provisions.98 Finally, they pointed out that 
unlike the reference, this case presented empirical evidence that was not available in 
1990. It was their position that a “material change in circumstances” justifies a full 
hearing on the merits.99  
 
 
The Attorneys General argued the standard for overturning a Supreme Court 
decision is high and requires reasons that are “beyond compelling”.100 It was their 
position that taking a second look at the conclusions of the Supreme Court in the 
Prostitution Reference would need to be grounded in either law or evidence, which 
they contended Bedford had not shown. This is despite the fact that the Federal 
government completed some of the research on which Bedford relies.101 
 
 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
97 Bedford, supra note 2 at 70.
 
98 Ibid at 71.
 
99 Ibid at 72.
 
100 Ibid at 74.
 
101 Ibid at 73.
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Himel J recognized the principle of stare decisis, but also considered the 
body of jurisprudence that provided guidance on when a court can revisit an issue. 
She used Laskin JA’s reasoning in Polowin Real Estate Ltd as a justification to 
reconsider the issue.102 Polowin contended that firm reliance on stare decisis “might 
lead to injustices in individual cases.”103 She also relied on the authority of the five 
factors listed by the Supreme Court in Bernard,104 Chaulk,105 and Salituro106 which 
establish when the top court can overrule an earlier decision. The factors are:  
 
Where a previous decision does not reflect the values of the Canadian 
Charter of Rights and Freedoms; where a previous decision is 
inconsistent with or “attenuated” by a later decision of the Court; where 
the social, political or economic assumptions underlying a previous 
decision are no longer valid in a contemporary society; where the 
previous state of the law was uncertain or where a previous decision 
caused uncertainty; and, in criminal cases, where the result of overruling 
is to establish a rule favourable to the accused.107 
 
 
 The factors are echoed by the trial decision Leeson v. University of Regina, 
which stated: “necessarily such revisitations must commence at the trial court 
level.”108 Himel J interpreted the authorities as allowing a lower court to deviate 
from a Supreme Court decision when the years between the decisions have yielded 
new jurisprudence and social facts justify readdressing the issue at bar.109 The 
evidence before Himel J was not present when the Supreme Court ruled in 1990 and 
she reasoned that the “social, political and economic assumptions underlying the 
Prostitution Reference are no longer valid today.”110 
 
 
The Court of Appeal agreed the issues and evolution of s.7 warranted 
reexamining the bawdy-house and communicating provisions, because security of 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
102 Polowin Real Estate Ltd. v. The Dominion of Canada General Insurance Co. (2006) 76 OR (3d) 161 
[Polowin Real Estate].
 
103 Bedford, supra note 2 at 68; Polowin Real Estate, supra note 119 at 121.
 
104 R v Bernard, [1988] 2 SCR 833.
 
105 R v Chaulk, [1990] 3 SCR 1303.
 
106 R v Salituro, [1991] 3 SCR 654.
 
107 Bedford, supra note 2 at 81.
 
108 Leeson v. University of Regina (2007), 301 Sask R 316, 2007 SKQB 252 qtd. in Bedford, supra, note 
2 at 82.
 
109 Bedford, supra note 2 at 83.
 
110 Ibid at 83.
 




the person was not at issue in the Prostitution Reference.111 However, with regard to 
the argument that the communicating provision violated s. 2(b) and needed to be 
revisited, the Court of Appeal found it was not open for Himel J to overrule the 
decision of the highest court, only to develop the record so the Supreme Court can 
determine whether or not it believes their previous position should be reevaluated.112 
The Court of Appeal also found that Himel J’s reliance on the authority of Polowin 
Real Estate was misguided as it only allows for a court of the same level to 
reconsider its own decisions.113 The Court of Appeal also held it was not open for 
Himel J. to rule on the issue just because it had been framed differently from the 
previous decision of the Supreme Court.114 The Court of Appeal was concerned this 
would open decisions of the Supreme Court to reevaluation by the lower courts too 
frequently and relegate the “vibrant living tree” of constitutional interpretation to be 
recast into a “garden of annuals to be regularly uprooted and replaced.”115  
 
 
 While the two levels of courts disagreed in their approach to when previously 
decided issues warrant revisiting, the more important point is that the Supreme Court 
has agreed to take a fresh look at the communicating provision. It will rest with the 
top court to decide whether the provision can remain in its current form or whether it 
will fail to pass constitutional muster in light of the evolved circumstances. With the 
benefit of the record from both levels of court and the overwhelming evidence of the 
harms that are worsened by the impugned provision, a Supreme Court decision to 
strike down the communicating provision would not be a moral endorsement of sex 
work. It would be a welcome move to help protect a vulnerable group, by allowing 
them to use techniques which prevent violence in sex work, which in and of itself is 
not a criminal act. It would also pave the way for community groups to expand upon 
programs that help move sex workers off the streets such as safe-house brothels.116 A 
Vancouver study, the results of which will be used as affiant evidence in the Bedford 
appeal to the Supreme Court, found that when safe spaces were offered for sex 
workers, the result was not only increased safety, but facilitated better relationships 
with police, access to informal safety mechanisms, an enhanced ability to negotiate 
transactions and a greater sense of dignity.117  The positive impact of these programs 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
111Ibid at 52, 66.
 
112 Bedford Appeal, supra note 5 at 76.
 
113 Ibid at 81.
 
114 Ibid at 82.
 
115 Ibid at 84.
 
116Safe house brothels provide spaces for sex workers to bring clients but sex workers are still dependant 
on soliciting those clients as currently prohibited by the communicating provision. See Bedford Appeal, 
supra note 5 at 368.
 
117 Andrea Krüsi et al “Negotiating Safety and Sexual Risk Reduction with Clients in Unsanctioned Safer 
Indoor Sex Work Environments: A Qualitative Study”, (June 2012) 102 American Journal of Public 
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cannot be continued without law reform. 
 
 
 The report of the Missing Women Commission of Inquiry in British 
Columbia echoes many of the arguments that were made about the dangers faced by 
street-based sex workers, as many of them became victims of serial murderer Robert 
Pickton. Although the Commission, lead by former BC Attorney General Wally 
Oppal, was criticized for not going far enough to include the voices of marginalized 
women during the hearing process,118 the Commission confirmed “[t] here is no 
dispute that women engaged in the survival sex trade are at an extremely elevated 
risk for various forms of severe violence”.119 
 
 
THE IMPACT OF THE INSITE DECISION 
 
The 2011 Supreme Court decision in PHS will have a large impact on the Bedford 
case. The Supreme Court in PHS held that the government does have an obligation to 
protect those who are harmed by a law, when it can be empirically shown that the 
harms created by the law are more severe than the harms prevented. The Court found 
that the Minister of Health’s refusal to grant a s. 56 exemption to the application of 
ss. 4(1) and 5(1) of the Controlled Drugs and Substances Act which would allow for 
the continued operation of Insite, a safe-injection site in Vancouver’s Downtown 
East Side, represented a breach of s. 7 rights that was both arbitrary and grossly 
disproportionate to the health and safety objectives of the Act and could not be 
upheld by the limitations in s.1 of the Charter.120 
 
 
 As anticipated, the decision in PHS has reverberated within the courts, who 
have already considered the implications of the ruling in relation to sex work.121 In 
Bedford, a wealth of evidence was presented showing the impugned provisions 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
Health, No 6, 1154-1159.
 
118 “Legal Group pulls out of B.C.’s Missing Women Inquiry” CBC News (20 September 2011), Online: 
CBC News <http://www.cbc.ca/news/canada/british-columbia/story/2011/09/20/bc-pivot-missing-
women.html>.; Darcie Bennett, “New report critical of Missing Women Inquiry issued weeks before 




119 Forsaken: Report of the Missing Women Commission of Inquiry: Nobodies: How and Why We 
Failed the Missing and Murdered Women, Vol IIA (Victoria: Distribution Centre, 2012) at 1.
 
120 PHS, supra note 15 at 127.
 
121 Cameron Ward, “Canada (A.G.) v. PHS Community Services Society – The Insite Decision” Case 
Comment (2012) 50:1 Alta L Rev 195. PHS has also been cited in Carter v. Canada (Attorney General) 
2012 BCSC 886, which granted a constitutional exemption for Gloria Taylor from the Criminal Code 
provisions that prohibit assisted suicide. 
 




prevent sex workers from taking precautions which would help protect themselves 
from violence. The government’s own research validated claims made by Bedford: 
“[a] review of s. 213 by the Standing Committee on Justice and the Solicitor General 
in 1990 concluded that street prostitution in cities across the country either had not 
decreased or had been displaced to other neighbourhoods.”122 In reference to the 
ineffectiveness of s. 213, Himel J held that “[b]y increasing the risk of harm to street 
prostitutes, the communicating law is simply too high a price to pay for the 
alleviation of social nuisance.”123 She turned to the appeal decision in PHS, the most 
recent at the time, to reinforce that the government needs to balance both the 
intended effects of a law and the actual effects of a law.124 While safe, orderly 
communities are a laudable goal, this order should not be achieved at the expense of 
the lives and wellbeing of sex workers. 
 
 
 As Galldin, Robertson and Wiseman stated, “the autonomy protected by 
Section 7 does not differentiate between state-approved choices and those that may 
be unpopular.”125 The government has conducted research on sex work and different 
modes of regulating the sex trade. While those reports have been collecting dust, sex 
workers have continued to be the victims of violence. Not every choice rises to the 
level of Charter protection, however, in Rodriguez v. British Columbia (Attorney 
General),126 the Supreme Court, referencing Morgentaler,127 recognized the 
importance of personal autonomy and to what degree s.7 can be asserted to protects 
the rights that it grants. They stated: “personal autonomy involving, at the very least, 
control over one's bodily integrity free from state interference and freedom from 
state-imposed psychological and emotional stress”.128 To hold true to those values, it 
is imperative that the Supreme Court now strike down the impugned provisions.  
 
 
On appeal, the Attorney General stated “the court below erred in assuming 
that an individual is entitled to engage in prostitution and that Parliament is obligated 
to minimize hindrances and maximize safety for those that do so contrary to law.”129 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
122  Parliamentary Information and Research Service, Prostitution in Canada: An Overview by Julie Cool 
(Ottawa: Library of Parliament, 2004), Online: Government of Canada Publications <http://dsp-
psd.pwgsc.gc.ca/Collection-R/LoPBdP/PRB-e/PRB0443-e.pdf>. 
 
123Bedford, supra note 2 at 504.
 
124 Ibid at 434. 
 
125 Galldin et al, supra, note 12 at 26.
 
126 Rodriguez v. British Columbia (AG), [1993] 3 SCR 519 [Rodriguez].
 
127 R v Morgentaler [1988] 1 SCR 30.
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129 Bedford v. Canada (Attorney General), 2010 ONCA 814 (Factum of Appellant). 
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The Court of Appeal found the authority of PHS was an apt comparison for the case 
that the sex workers had made.130 For sex workers, the situation is similar in that it is 
not sex work that poses the danger, but the client. The impugned provisions add to 
the danger of sex work by creating a situation where most precautions sex workers 
could take are prohibited by the criminal law. The Court of Appeal stated “in one 
sense, the prostitutes’ claim is even stronger in that prostitution, unlike illicit 
possession and use of narcotics, is not an unlawful activity.”131 The majority of the 
Court of Appeal later criticized Himel J’s reliance on PHS. MacPherson JA 
disagreed with the reversal of the majority’s opinion on the authority of PHS. It was 
his opinion that “PHS supports the conclusion that the communicating provision in 
this case, like the Ministerial decision in PHS violates s.7”.132   
 
 
While several cases have already turned to PHS as demonstrating that the 
principles of fundamental justice against arbitrariness, overbreadth and gross 
disproportionality are distinct and should be considered individually, it remains to be 
seen how the Supreme Court will apply the analysis to the Bedford case. Given 
MacPherson JA’s strong dissent, the reasons of the Supreme Court in PHS and the 
changes in circumstances since the Prostitution Reference, the Supreme Court should 
strike down the impugned provisions.  Due to the fact that a finding of gross 
disproportionality is a high standard to meet, the Supreme Court has yet to overturn a 
law on this basis under s. 7.133 It is possible Bedford will become a first in that 
regard. Deference must be paid to the objectives of legislation; however, the 
opportunity to protect an already marginalized group who face violence in the course 





Bedford should serve as a call to action. In the wake of the murder conviction of 
Robert Pickton, the dangers faced by sex workers have become more evident. The 
comments of Williams J, the British Columbia Supreme Court judge who sentenced 
Pickton, spoke to the fragile position of the murdered women which struck at the 
core of the Bedford case: “[t]he women who were murdered, each of them, were 
members of our community. They were women who had troubled lives and who 
found themselves in positions of extreme vulnerability.”134 That sex workers face a 	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133 Hamish Stewart, Fundamental Justice: Section 7 of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms 
(Toronto: Irwin Law Inc, 2012) at 149.
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greater propensity to violence, because of the criminal provisions that prevent them 
from taking measures to protect themselves should have been enough to compel the 
government to take action.  
 
 
A finding of unconstitutionality by Canada’s highest court would force the 
change necessary to bring Canada’s sex work laws in line with other liberal 
democracies like New Zealand where sex work was decriminalized in 2003 with the 
passing of the Prostitution Reform Act.135 The PRA, which commenced as a health 
initiative, repealed the criminal provisions surrounding the sex trade, and introduced 
new measures to criminalize only aspects that involve children. What was created is 
a comprehensive piece of legislation that offers sex workers not only greater 
protection from exploitation, but grants them the same occupational health and safety 
rights as any other worker. After being in force for five years, PRA underwent a 
review to ascertain its effectiveness. The report concluded that: 
 
 
During that time, the sex industry has not increased in size, and many of 
the social evils predicted by some who opposed the decriminalisation of 
the sex industry have not been experienced. On the whole, the PRA has 
been effective in achieving its purpose, and the Committee is confident 
that the vast majority of people involved in the sex industry are better 
off under the PRA than they were previously.136  
 
 
The Director of HIV, Health and Development practice for the UNDP commended 
New Zealand’s law for “promoting safety and slowing the spread of HIV”.137 With 
positive implications for both the safety and the health of sex workers, and a 
legislative model that has been proven effective, Canada should be confident in 
moving forward with law reform that would decriminalize the sex trade.  
 
 
Putting this issue back on the shelf for another twenty years would only put 
Canada further behind progressive nations that have already implemented legal 
reform to liberalize the sex trade. Prostitution will always find a place in society; 
decriminalizing the sex trade would mean that the law is no longer contributing to 
the violence that sex workers face.  	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